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Abstract
This paper analyzes data for a random sample drawn from the Dutch popu-
lation who reveal their propensity to invest and reward investments in building
up social capital by means of an economic experiment. We ﬁnd substantial het-
erogeneity and asymmetries in the propensity to invest and in the propensity
to reward investments. In particular, we ﬁnd strong evidence that the young,
elderly, and low educated individuals invest relatively less, but are relatively
more likely to reward investments in social capital. On the other hand, labor
market participation, income, and religion do not have any signiﬁcant impact
on behavior in the experiment.
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11 Introduction
According to Bowles and Gintis (2002),
Social capital refers to trust, concern for one’s associates, a willingness to
live by the norms of one’s community and to punish those who do not.
(p.1)
There is increasing empirical and theoretical evidence suggesting that a nation’s
level of social capital can inﬂuence its economic performance. The transactions
cost paradigm remains the traditional way of thinking about the mechanism by
which social capital affects economic performance. When societal capital is high,
transactions costs are low which makes organizations and governments more efﬁ-
cient which ultimately leads to better economic growth (see Zak and Knack, 2001),
Francois and Zabojnik, 2002) and improved organizational efﬁciency (La Porta, de
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997).
Because of these important macroeconomic relationships, it becomes relevant
for policy makers to investigate how population levels of social capital are shifted
as a result of changes in the characteristics of the population. Changes in age and
earnings distribution are two frequently cited structural changes western economies
will have to deal with in the future (Gruber and Wise, 2001; Gottschalk and Smeed-
ing, 1997). To perform these measurements, it is essential to measure with little
error contributions of individuals to building up and sustaining social capital, and
to perform these measurements on a sample of individuals randomly drawn from
a country’s population. The motivation for the ﬁrst requirement follows from the
law of large numbers, where average sample measures are consistent estimates of
2their population counterparts. The second requirement follows from the fact that
the estimated parameters we make inferences on will, in general, be biased if contri-
butions building up social capital are measured with error (see Bound, Brown, and
Mathiowetz, 2001).
Survey questionnaires (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Glaeser, Laibson, and Sac-
erdote, 2002) and laboratory experiments (e.g. Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995)
have been the two main empirical methods employed so far to analyze the deter-
minants of social capital or elements of social capital at the micro level. None of
these methods can provide researchers with both representative samples and accu-
rate measures of the underlying behavior of interest. The main advantage of sur-
veys is that it allows to make population inferences by observing the behavior of a
randomly drawn sample of individuals from that population. The main drawback
is that researchers run the risk of collecting answers to a vague and hypothetical
question which can create a discrepancy between someone’s answers and his actual
behavior. Such discrepancies can in part be attributed to differences in the inter-
pretation of the question across survey participants. Discrepancies may also arise
because individuals do not answer truthfully the question. Laboratory experiments
have the virtue of countering the effects associated with survey data by observing
the behavior of individuals placed in a context in which they have incentives for
making decisions revealing their true preferences. However, experiments suffer the
drawback that subjects are generally drawn from homogenous pools of university
students lacking the required variation in background characteristics to measure
precisely their inﬂuence on observed behavior.
3In this paper, we combine the strengths of survey and experimental methods by
having a large representative sample of the Dutch population play a computerized
version of the investment game of Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995). The power
of our approach lies in the capacity to approximate the environment of a traditional
laboratory experiment while overcoming the need of bringing individuals in a lab.
Our choice of the investment game is particularly well suited for the analysis at
hand as elements of trust, altruism, and reciprocity used by Bowles and Gintis to
deﬁne social capital have also shown to characterize the decision of players in this
game. Contrary to other work (e.g. Cox, 2004), our focus is on evaluating how
the propensities to invest and reward investments vary across an heterogeneous
population rather than on uncovering whether differences in behavior are the result
of trust, trustworthiness or altruism. By doing so, we focus directly on determining
the subgroups of the Dutch population who are more likely to contribute to social
capital.
As will be discussed later, our approach has the additional advantage over lab
experiments of allowing to test for possible bias caused by using subjects selecting
themselves in the experiment based on observable or unobservable characteristics
which can be correlated with the decisions in the game, a topic on which very little
is known1 but which is crucial importance to judge if our results are to be represen-
tative of the behavior of the Dutch population as a whole.
1Eckel and Grossman (2000) report evidence suggesting the presence of participation bias in a
classroom experiment. Their approach however compares responses of participants by comparing
responses of student volunteers to that of pseudo-volunteers who still partly self-select themselves
in the experiment.
4Our results are supportive of substantial heterogeneity in investment and re-
turns on investment behavior in the Dutch population. Interestingly, we do not ﬁnd
any evidence of participation bias in the experiment, suggesting that our results are
representative of overall population behavior. One of the important ﬁndings of our
paper is that holding everything else constant, the young and the elderly invest rel-
atively less but reward investments relatively more than middle aged individuals.
We suggest an explanation of this unexpected effect which relies on comparing re-
sponders expectations to the possible realizations. More speciﬁcally, an event might
provoke disappointment or surprise depending on what the individual expected
ex-ante. If emotions of surprise following unexpected generous offers trigger posi-
tive responses, than it is expected that the reward of an individual will be higher the
lower are his expectations. In the case of our age proﬁle, we show that the relatively
lower investment levels of the young and elderly are associated with relatively lower
expectations about receiving investments.
An important aspect of social capital highlighted in the citation of Bowles and
Gintis above is the role played by social norms in determining socially conscious
behavior. Gauging from the growing literature on the role of social norms in gener-
ating efﬁcient social outcomes (e.g. Ostrom, 2000), we have good reasons to believe
that they are likely to play a role in determining the decisions in our experiment.
Controlling for their effect will be particularly important if other determinants of
investments are correlated, hence empirically confounded with social norms. Esti-
mation of the effect of norms on economic behavior is complicated by severe iden-
tiﬁcation problems which occur when an individual’s perceived expected behavior
of others is inferred from the sample choice data (see e.g. Brock and Durlauf, 2001,
5for an overview of the identiﬁcation problems). We tackle these problems by elic-
iting for relevant subjects their subjective expectations of the average behavior of
other individuals in the same role and ﬁnd that social norms do play an important
role in explaining investment behavior in our experiment. Interestingly, we show
that not controlling for beliefs in our experiment leads to wrong inferences on the
investment behavior of subjects with respect to their gender and level of education.
Ortmann, Fitzgerald, and Boeing (2000) also elicited subjective expectations of pro-
posers in the investment game as a means to enforce comprehension of the game,
but they do not investigate how these beliefs affected the actions in the game.
Because social preferences like altruism, fairness, trust, and reciprocity are rele-
vant concepts to explain many other forms of strategic interactions involving social
dilemmas (see Camerer, 2003 for a general overview), we believe that our results
are relevant to understand many other social dilemma games. This is particularly
relevant for public good games, of which the present experiment can be seen as a
special two player case where only one player makes socially efﬁcient contributions
but who may end up worse off if the other player in some sense ”free rides” on his
investment in the social good.
Our experiment also has the virtue of providing additional evidence on the par-
allelism between the lab and the ﬁeld. This parallelism has generally been tested
using newspaper experiments (e.g., see Bosch–Dom` enech, Montalvo, Nagel, and
Satorra, 2002), and by comparing samples of students to specialized samples in-
cluding professional traders (Haigh and List, 2004) or CEO’s (Fehr and List, 2004),
none of which are representative of a nation’s population. Three noteworthy ex-
periments have recently been run with representative samples. Harrison, Lau, and
6Williams (2002) use a random sample of the Danish population to investigate the
heterogeneity in individual discount rates. Hey (2002) used the CentERpanel of
Tilburg University (more on this panel later on) to have a random sample of the
Dutch population play an experiment on decision making under risk and uncer-
tainty. Fehr, Fischbacher, Rosenbladt, Schupp, and Wagner (2003) present results
from an interview based experiment with a social dilemma structure using the Ger-
man Socio–Economic Panel.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
design of the experiment, the experimental procedure, and our sample. Section 3
presents our experimental results investment and returns to investment behavior in
the Dutch population. Section 3.3 presents empirical evidence suggesting that the
age patterns of the previous section can be rationalized by a surprise effect. Section
4 concludes.
2 The Experimental Design and the Sample
The recruitment of our subjects was made by CentERdata, the survey research in-
stitute of Tilburg University in the Netherlands. The main activity of CentERdata is
to manage and carry out panel surveys through a telepanel: the CentERpanel (here-
after CP), consisting of approximately 2000 representative Dutch households. Every
Friday, CP’s household members receive a questionnaire which they are asked to ﬁll
in at any time between Friday and Tuesday of the following week. This question-
naire is ﬁlled at home either on a computer or on a television set which is connected
to a set–up box linking the household to the CentERdata server. In order to keep the
7sample representative of the Dutch population, low income households without a
computer or a television set are given the necessary equipment in order to complete
the weekly questionnaire.2
There are many reasons why the CP is an attractive medium to conduct exper-
iments. First, it gives us access to a representative sample of a population, which
is one of the key features of our study. Second, because participants answer ques-
tions on a computer or a television set, we are able to replicate as closely as possible
the environment of a laboratory experiment, which simpliﬁes comparisons of our
results with those of the existing literature. Third, because participants communi-
cate with CentERdata, the experiment is double blind as participants were told that
they will be anonymously matched and that their identities would not be revealed
to the experimenters. Finally, as CentERdata reimburses the weekly telephone costs
for answering the questionnaire by crediting CentERpoints (1 CentERpoint = 0.01
Euro) to their private bank accounts four times a year, our participants are already
familiar to payment in ﬁctitious currency. This allows us to use CentERpoints as
the experimental currency unit and reimburse our participants in a very convenient
way.
Our design closely follows the investment game proposed by Berg, Dickhaut
and McCabe (1995). One attractive aspect of using their framework is that this al-
lows us to contrast our results with existing student-based studies. Moreover, this
2For a description of the recruitment, sampling methods, and past usages of the CentERpanel see:
www.centerdata.nl . Children below 16 years of age as well as immigrants are excluded from the
panel, the latter group for the reason that their language proﬁciency in Dutch makes it difﬁcult for
them to answer the questions on a weekly basis.
8design has proven to be robust to several framing effects (Ortmann, Fitzgerald, and
Boeing, 2000) and role reversals (Burks, Carpenter, and Verhoogen, 2003). A sender
and a responder were both endowed with 500 CentERpoints.3 The sender could
send money to the responder from his endowment. We discretized the choice set
of the sender to 11 investment possibilities I 2 f0,50,...,450,500g. The amount the
sender sent was doubled by the experimenters and added to the endowment of the
responder. Responders made their choices using the strategy method, by which
they were asked to state how much they would return to senders for all 11 pos-
sible amounts they could receive. The response which corresponded to the actual
decision of the sender was chosen to be the effective action and determined the pay-
off of both participants. After all participants made their decisions, senders and
responders were randomly matched and payoffs were computed based on the de-
cisions of the pair. The ﬁnal payoffs were computed as follows: a sender received
the initial 500 CentERpoints reduced by the amount invested (I) plus the amount
received from the responder, while the responder received her initial endowment of
500 CentERpoints, the amount sent by the sender multiplied by 2 minus the amount
returned to the sender.4
The strategy method, dating back to Selten (1967) was chosen to overcome the
3For ease of reading we keep the terms “sender” and “responder” for the different roles. In the
experiment we omitted suggestive labels and referred to the person itself or to its opponent as “the
matched panel member.” Computer screens of the original experiment (in Dutch) are available upon
request. The translated text of all screens is enclosed in appendix A.
4The multiplier represents efﬁciency gains of the social interaction. Multipliers vary across stud-
ies. Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe for instance use a multiplier of three, whereas Glaeser, Laibson,
Scheinkman and Soutter (2000) apply a multiplier of two.
9difﬁculty of having CP members interact in real time. This method has several ad-
ditional advantages. First, it facilitates data acquisition as the complete strategy
plan for all 11 possible amounts received is elicited. Second, as our game may seem
complex to some subjects, the strategy method requires that people thoroughly fa-
miliarize themselves with the ramiﬁcations of all choices, so that we do not retrieve
data from uninformed subjects.5
Under the assumption that both players maximize their monetary payoffs, the
Nash equilibrium of the game is for the sender to send nothing to the responder, as
the responder’s dominant strategy is to return nothing to the sender. As shown by
Cox (2004), observing positive amounts sent is interpreted as evidence that people
trust or have altruistic preferences towards others. Likewise, observing amounts
returned is taken as evidence of reciprocity and altruistic behavior. It is important
to stress that repeated game effects, retaliation strategies, and game experience ef-
fects are deliberately excluded by our experimental design. Thus, one can think of
the current design as measuring the basic investment and reward propensity of an
individual at a given point in time.
The Nash equilibrium prediction above strongly hinges on the implicit assump-
tions that senders expect responders to return nothing to them. On the other hand, if
senders expect responders to reward their investments, then it is rational for senders
to invest in others. This simple reasoning highlights the central role played by ex-
pectations in determining investment decisions. Accordingly, we elicit the beliefs of
5There is weak evidence suggesting that a hot environment triggers stronger responses in two
player games. Brandts and Charness (2000) ﬁnd that the strategy method and the hot environment
do not yield signiﬁcant different responses in two simple sequential two player games.
10players in our experiment with a series of questions, all of which were asked after
players made their decisions in order to circumvent the possibility that belief elici-
tation induces non–cooperative behavior when asked before the play of the game.
Subjects were not rewarded based on the accuracy of their expectations.6 Senders
were ﬁrst asked to state how much they think their responder will return to them.
They were then asked to state their subjective expectation about what the average
sender sends which serves as an estimate of their subjective social norm of behavior.
Responders on the other hand simply had to state how much they thought of receiv-
ing fromsenders. As will be made more clearly in the next section, we use the beliefs
of responders to investigate whether decisions recorded using the strategy method
are consistent with decisions associated with outcomes responders believed would
materialize during the play of the game. This concluded the experimental part of
the session.
All players were then asked to answer two survey questions. The ﬁrst question
asked players to state their average experience with trust
Lifetime trust experience question In the past, when you trusted someone, was
your trust usually rewarded or usually exploited?
(Always rewarded) 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 (Always exploited).
6There are theoretical grounds suggesting that, assuming subjects are risk neutral and do not dis-
tort probabilities, beliefs elicited using the quadratic scoring rule should be more accurate than un-
paid elicited beliefs. The empirical evidence seems not very supportive of this. Ortmann, Fitzgerald,
and Boeing (2000) ﬁnd that unpaid senders in their trust game had surprisingly accurate estimates
of the average amounts sent by other senders while both Friedman and Massaro (1998) and Sonne-
mans and Offerman (2001) ﬁnd insigniﬁcant differences between elicited beliefs of paid and unpaid
subjects.
11This question will be used to test for the presence of state dependent behavior
whereby differences in past experiences with trust may lead to different investment
behavior. The second question was the WVS trust question
WVS trust question Generally speaking would you say that most people can be
trusted or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people?
1.) Most people can be trusted.
2.) You have to be very careful.
3.) I do not know.
Two weeks after the experiment, each participant received feedback information
on the outcome of the game and their ﬁnal payoff which was later credited to their
CentER bank accounts. The experiment was conducted in two sessions, in the 31st
and the 36th weeks of the calendar year 2002. Individuals contacted had to read an
opening screen informing them that they were selected to participate in an experi-
ment conducted jointly by a team of university researchers. A detailed description
of the game followed with the mode of payments. Each person was informed that
conditional on their participation, they would be randomly assigned to one of the
roles and matched to another panel member. The role was revealed once a panel
member had agreed to participate. We contacted 541 panel members from which 42
declined to participate. Of the 499 panel members who completed the experiment,
276 were senders and 223 were responders.7
7Note, that the number of senders exceeds the number of responders. In order to balance the
unequal number of players in both roles, 53 responders were randomly assigned twice to a sender.
As all other participants, those 53 responders received payments resulting from only one (the ﬁrst)
matching.
12Compared to other experiments, we are in the unique position to observe the
characteristics of those who deliberately decide not to participate in the experiment.
We tested for the presence of participation bias in our experiment. Participation
bias is present if the behavior of participants in the experiment is not representative
of the average behavior in the population, presumably because participants have a
predisposition to gamble or lower risk aversion, to name only two possible expla-
nations for this effect. Applying the approach by Heckman (1978) we re-estimated
all models presented in this paper controlling for sample selection. We found no
evidence of participation bias in any decision. Estimation results are available at the
authors upon request.
Table 1 gives the description of the variables and descriptive statistics of the 541
household members contacted for senders, receivers and non–participants. The
means of most variables are relatively identical across non–participants, senders,
and responders. 63.7% of the persons contacted were heads of households and
most players either had a secondary or vocational training degree. Catholics and
protestants are the two most important religious communities in the sample and
their relative weights in the three participation categories are very similar. Two
notable differences across the three groups concern work propensity and age. Non–
participants are on average 10 years older than both senders and responders. This
age effect is also reﬂected in a higher labor market retirement frequency and lower
labor work participation.
133 Experimental Results
The distribution of amounts invested I is shown in ﬁgure 1. As we can see, this
distribution is characterized by the fact that it is heavily skewed to the left with a
mode at the equal split category (i.e. 250 CentERpoints), and the majority of subjects
send positive amounts. Our ﬁrst important result is that this distribution is familiar
to that usually found in lab–experiments with student samples (e.g. Berg, Dickhaut,
and McCabe, 1995, Ortmann, Fitzgerald, and Boeing, 2000).
We measure propensity to respond to investments along the lines suggested by
Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman and Soutter (2000) using the return ratio, deﬁned as
the amount returned divided by the amount available to return. In our experiment,
the available amount to return equals the amount received multiplied by two, plus
the experimental endowment of 500 CentERpoints. Because we use the strategy
method, responders were asked to state how much they will give back for each of
the 11 possible amounts they can receive from the sender. This implies that we
observe a sequence fRa 2 [0,1]ja 2 f0,50,...,500gg for each responder, where Ra
denotes the return ratio when receiving a CentERpoints from the sender. The main
advantage of the return ratio is that it is automatically scaled, which controls for
the fact that receivers can send more simply because the total available amount in-
creases with a. Figure 2 presents two curves of the return ratio. The curve with
empty squares presents the return ratio computed by taking the median return for
eachpossibleoutcomesentforall223responders. Thetwoimportantfeaturesofthis
ﬁgure are that the ratio 1) monotonically increases and is concave in the amounts re-
ceived, 2) a signiﬁcant fraction of the responders return nothing (especially in low
14categories) while practically no responder returns the entire possible amount. This
differs substantially from existing results on the investment game (e.g. Berg, Dick-
haut, McCabe, 1995; Cox, 2004)whodonotreportevidencesuggestingthatamounts
sent and amounts returned are correlated. It could be argued that the monotonicity
observed is a consequence of using the strategy method which forced respondents
to sequentially enter their choices for outcomes in increasing order of the amounts
sent. To check this possibility, we also computed for each outcome the return ratio
using only a responder’s decision associated with the outcome believed to material-
ize in the play of the game. Hence, increases in return rations across two consecutive
outcomes in the later case cannot be the result of having the same individuals re-
porting monotonically increasing return ratios. Results are graphed as a curve with
solid circles along the previous curve in Figure 2. We ﬁnd that the shape of both
curves are surprisingly similar across all outcomes,8 reconﬁrming that rewards to
investment do increase monotonically with the amounts invested.
Would it pay to invest ? Figure 3 presents density estimates of senders returns
on investments, computed as (RI ¡ I)/I for all investment possibilities I. Each line
represents the estimated distribution of returns for a given number of CentERpoints
sent. If responders return to senders exactly what they sent, the return on invest-
ment is 0. If responders do not return anything to the senders, the return on in-
vestment is -1. Apart from the distribution of returns when 50 CentERpoints are
sent, all distributions have roughly the same shape. The common ﬁnding in labo-
ratory investment experiments is that investment barely pays, as responders return
8Outcomes associated with amounts sent of 400 and 450 CentERpoints were believed to occur by
only 3 and 0 responders respectively, and were not added to the graph.
15to senders what they have sent (Camerer, 2003). Even though, we ﬁnd that invest-
ing pays although efﬁciency gains are smaller, these gains are only on a small scale.
Again, ourresultsreconﬁrmtheﬁndingsbasedonstudentpopulations. Weﬁndthat
the median return on investment is slightly above 0 for every amount sent. Further-
more, the probability of getting nothing back from a receiver (return on investment
of 0) is not zero. Thus, it seems the aggregate behavior of our heterogeneous sample
parallels to some extent that based on student samples. We next investigate how the
heterogeneous characteristics of our subjects explains differences in their individual
behavior.
3.1 Empirical Results on Investment Behavior
We begin our empirical analysis by ﬁrst focusing on the amounts invested I, an
ordinal and discrete variable. A standard model which maps an individual’s unob-
served (latent) investment propensity I¤ into our observed experimental outcome is
the ordered probit model (e.g. Maddala, 1983):
I¤
i = x0
ib + #i (1)
Ii = j if mj¡1 < I¤
i · mj, j = 0,...,K (2)
#ijxi » N(0,1). (3)
The index i denotes the individual, xi is a vector of explanatory variables including
a constant term, b is the vector of parameters of interest, and #i is the error term. We
make the usual identifying normalizations m¡1 = ¡¥, m0 = 0, and m10 = ¥. The
bounds m0,...,m9 can be seen as nuisance parameters. The standard way to esti-
16mate this model is maximum likelihood (ML). However, the ordered probit model
requires a sufﬁcient amount of observations for each outcome to estimate the thresh-
old parameters. As can be seen from ﬁgure 1, categories 300 to 450 CentERpoints
haveverylittleobservations. Inourempiricalapplication, wemergetheseoutcomes
and estimate an ordered probit model with K = 8 outcomes.
The ﬁrst speciﬁcation of Table 2 presents estimates of the ordered probit model
using as regressors a standard set of background characteristics, reported life expe-
rience with trust (TRUSTEXP), subjects’ beliefs about the amount they expect to be
returned to them (STHINK), and the average amount they expect other senders will
send (SMEANS).9 Contrary to the earlier ﬁndings based on survey trust questions
(Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002), we do not ﬁnd that gender of subjects to inﬂuence
their levels of investments in others. We also do not ﬁnd any effect of the family
size (HSIZE), whether an individual is retired from the labor force (RETIRED) or
whether an individual works.
Both the linear and quadratic term in age are signiﬁcant and indicate that, all
else constant, the propensity to invest increases until the age of 37, beyond which it
starts to decline. This reconﬁrms the inverted–U shape pattern usually found in the
social capital literature (e.g. Putnam, 2000, although those studies report that social
capital reaches a high at 45 years of age).
Education also has an inverted–U proﬁle. We ﬁnd that individuals with sec-
ondary and technical training are more likely to make higher investments than sub-
jects with either low education levels (the omitted category) and subjects with uni-
9We have experimented with a speciﬁcation including cross–terms but none was found to be
statistically signiﬁcant.
17versity degrees. We classiﬁed subjects either as protestants, catholics, or atheists. We
ﬁnd no evidence that either catholics or protestants invest differently than atheists
or individuals of other religions (the omitted category).
Both belief variables, STHINK and SMEANS, have positive effects on invest-
ment behavior and are highly signiﬁcant. These results indicate that senders who
expected to receive more sent more, and senders who thought senders on average
would send more increased their amount sent. The latter result corroborates the
presence of social norms geared at increasing efﬁciency and social cooperation. In
order to asses the contribution of beliefs to the empirical model, we computed a
likelihood–ratio test comparing speciﬁcation 1 and 3. The estimation results of the
speciﬁcation omitting beliefs change in two noteworthy ways: gender has a sig-
niﬁcantly positive impact and the education pattern is not as clearly pronounced.
The test value of 227.28 (5% c2 critical value of 5.99) indicates that apart from being
statistically signiﬁcant, beliefs substantially improve the predictive ﬁt of the model.
Contrary to our expectation, previous experiences when having trusted others
in the past (TRUSTEXP) do not affect investments in our experiment, conditional of
their background characteristics. This contrasts with the predictions of the indirect
evolutionary approach to adaptation through experience literature (for a recent sur-
vey see Ostrom, 2000) which suggests that someone’s social investment behavior is
directly related to his past experiences with trust. One possible explanation for this
is that part of our investments are motivated by altruistic preferences which are sta-
tionary, rather than by trust behavior, which is ultimately a matter of beliefs about
responses of others which can be updated over time as the result of past experiences.
Aﬁnalsurprisingresultisthatindividualsanswering“Mostpeoplecanbetrusted.”
18to the WVS trust question are found to have signiﬁcantly higher investment behav-
ior in others. This is in sharp contrast with results of Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman
and Soutter (2000) who did not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant effect.
Finally, it is possible that including the survey measure in our regression causes
multicollinearity amongst the regressors, which could have an ill-effect on our in-
ferences if both investment behavior, which is partly determined by trust behavior,
and answers to survey trust questions are correlated and determined by the same
background characteristics. In order to check for this possibility, we estimated our
model excluding this variable. Speciﬁcation 2 in table present the results. We see
that all parameter estimates of the model retain their sign and signiﬁcance when
survey trust answers are excluded from the model, suggesting that multicollinear-
ity is not a problem.
3.2 Empirical Results on Reward to Investment




ih+ g1a + g2a2 + ei (4)
Rai = r¤
ai if R¤
ai > 0 (5)
= 0 if R¤
ai · 0 (6)
eijzi » N(0,s2) (7)
where equation (4) describes an individual’s latent propensity to reward invest-
ments, and equations (5) and (6) describe the censoring rule which allows respon-
ders with extremely low propensities to return nothing with positive probability. In
19a similar way to the investment propensity (1), the return propensity is modelled as
a function of background characteristics zi and an unobservable component ei. The
quadratic form in a is added to capture the monotone increasing shape of amounts
returned observed in the data.10
The estimation results are presented in table 3.11 The ﬁrst speciﬁcation includes
standard background characteristics of the responder, reported trust experience,
their beliefs about what they expect to receive from the sender (RTHINK),12 and
responders’ answers to the WVS trust question. The second speciﬁcation extends
the ﬁrst speciﬁcation by adding interaction terms between age and trust experience,
answers to the WVS trust question, as well as responders’ beliefs about the expected
amountsenttothem. Wecomparethetwospeciﬁcationsusingalog–likelihoodratio
test. The extended speciﬁcation which includes interaction terms is clearly preferred
to the ﬁrst speciﬁcation.13 Accordingly, our analysis below will focus on the results
of the extended speciﬁcation.
As could be seen from the raw data in ﬁgure 2, amounts returned monotonically
10We have estimated a less restrictive speciﬁcation with dummy variables for each a category.
Results were numerically identical to those presented above.
11It is well known (e.g. Goldberger, 1983) that the Tobit model is sensitive to the normality and
homoscedasticity assumptions of equation (7). We tested these assumptions using a speciﬁcation
test proposed by Newey (1987) which is based on the comparison of parameter estimates of the Tobit
model and those of the Symmetrically Trimmed Least Squares estimator (STLS) of Powell (1986),
the later which relaxes both the normality and homoscedasticity assumptions of the Tobit model.
The test values (15.656 (c2
18, p=0.617) for speciﬁcation 1, 3.106 (c2
21, p=0.999) for speciﬁcation 2 and
19.234 (c2
19, p=0.442) for speciﬁcation 3) never reject the null hypothesis that the Tobit model is well
speciﬁed. All results based on the STLS estimator are available from the authors.
12RTHINK is coded from 0 to 10, where each unit is worth 50 CentERpoints.
13The log–likelihood ratio test value is 19.9, signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
20increase and are concave in a, the amounts received. This is also reﬂected in the
Tobit estimates, where the ﬁrst order term g1 is positive and the second order term
g2 is negative, both signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The aging component of rewards
to investments is captured by the parameters of retirement status (RETIRED), age
(AGE), and the three interaction terms (AGESQ, AGE £ WVS, AGE £ RTHINK).
Both the linear and quadratic terms of age are signiﬁcant, indicating a non-linear
relationship between the propensity to reward investments and age. We ﬁnd that
this propensity reaches its lowest level when individuals reach the age of 34 years,
and increases beyond that.14 The shape of this relationship is very different than
that of investment behavior. There, we found that the propensity to invest increased
until the age of 34 and decreases beyond that. We next evaluated the age turning
pointsforthosewhoreporttrustingothers(WVS=1)andthosewhodonot(WVS=0).
The age proﬁle of individuals who state they do not trust others reaches a low at 21
years of age, while it reaches a low at 43 years of age for those who declare trusting
others. Section 3.3 discusses further this result and offers a potential explanation.
Previously, we found that the relationship between investments and education
was inverted U shape, with subjects without a secondary degree and those with
university degrees investing signiﬁcantly less than low educated individuals. The
relation between education and the propensity to reward investments is very dif-
ferent. Less educated subjects (the omitted category) return signiﬁcantly more than
educated subjects, all degrees confounded. Moreover, the parameter estimates sug-
14Because of the interaction terms, computation of these turning points requires that we ﬁx the
values of WVS and RTHINK. In order to get an overall picture we evaluate those variables at their
sample means.
21gest an U shape relationship, with individuals with university degrees rewarding
more that subjects with technical education degrees. The effect of gender also dis-
tinguishes investment behavior from reward behavior. While gender was found to
have no impact on investments, we ﬁnd here that men return on average signiﬁ-
cantly less than women.
Like for the case of investment behavior, beliefs of responders play an important
role in determining reward behavior. Responders who believed they would receive
more had higher average return ratios. To gain some insights on the importance
of beliefs on reward behavior, we estimated our extended speciﬁcation omitting
beliefs. Speciﬁcation 3 in Table 3 presents the results. Notable changes are that
gender becomes insigniﬁcant and that the linear and quadratic terms of age are no
longer signiﬁcant. A log–likelihood ratio test (value of 85.88, signiﬁcant at the 1%
level) conﬁrms that omitting beliefs substantially lowers the predictive ﬁt of the
model.
One of the interesting ﬁndings of Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman and Soutter
(2000) was that answers to the WVS trust question did not correlate with invest-
mentbehaviorbut correlatedratherwellwiththepropensitytorewardinvestments.
While we did not ﬁnd evidence supporting the ﬁrst observation (see the above anal-
ysis of investment behavior), we ﬁnd that effect with respect to reward behavior is
reconﬁrmed in our data.
We end by noting that some individual characteristics have no effect on their
propensity to reward investments. This is the case of subjects’ income, whether
they work or not, their retirement status, religion, and their lifetime trust experi-
ence. Interestingly, none of these characteristics were found to explain investment
22behavior.
3.3 Discussion
In the literature on social capital, trust, trustworthiness, and altruism go hand in
hand, suggesting that individuals investing more in others should be expected to
be those relatively more likely to reward investments. Thus, contrary to the results
of the previous section, we should not expect that the young and elderly invest
relatively less but reward investments relatively more than middle aged individu-
als. In this section, we show that one potential explanation of this paradox is that
the young and elderly, apart from making relatively lower investments, also have
the relatively lowest expectations of the average amounts that would be invested in
them by proposers in the game. Hence, any amounts invested in them is more likely
to exceed their expectations and be perceived are generous investments, triggering
a relatively stronger emotional response which translates into relatively higher pre-
miums on rewarding investments. For this explanation to be consistent with the
investment-age and the reward-age relationships found in our data, it must be that
the young and elderly have relatively lower subjective expectations of the levels
invested in them as compared to middle-age individuals.
In order to test this hypothesis, we model the relationship between beliefs and
age using the following semiparametric regression model (Robinson, 1988)
RTHINKi = w0
iq+ g(AGEi) + zi (8)
where RTHINKi represents responders’ beliefs about the amount to be invested in
them by proposers, wi is a vector of observable characteristics including gender,
23education, religion, the work decision, g(¢) is an unknown function, zi is an error
term assumed to have mean 0, and q is a vector of unknown parameters. The main
advantage of this semiparametric model is that the relationship between beliefs and
age does not need to be speciﬁed a priori, but is rather determined by the data. The
top panel of Figure 4 presents graphs of the investment-age and the reward-age re-
lationships based on results in Tables 2 and 3. The bottom graph of Figure 4 presents
the nonparametric estimate of the function g(¢) along with the 95% (pointwise) con-
ﬁdence bounds.15 The relation between beliefs and age supports our conjecture: it
is roughly concave, with beliefs progressively rising until the age of 40 and progres-
sively declining after. A striking feature of Figure 4 is that the turning points of
the investment, reward, and beliefs schedules are relatively well aligned around the
35-40 years range. This symmetry is clear evidence that age groups with relatively
lower propensity to invest are those with both the relatively lowest expectations
about the levels invested in them and the relatively strongest propensity to reward
investments.
4 Conclusions
This study presented results from a novel computerized experiment combining the
strengths of experiments and survey data collection methods which allowed to col-
lect data of investment behavior and reward to investment behavior for a random
sample of the Dutch population. Our experiment adds to the scarce body of lit-
15Results were found to be robust to the choice of conditioning variables. Parameter estimates are
available upon request.
24erature which has made attempts to lift experimental economics out of its more
traditional laboratory context which relies on homogeneous student subjects pools
to broad and representative samples of a population. The key advantages of this
approach are the ability to analyze revealed preference data for a random sample of
the Dutch population and to test for the presence of participation bias in the exper-
iment which would undermine the representativeness of our results for the entire
population.
We found strong evidence supporting substantial heterogeneity in propensities
to invest and to reward investments which build up social capital, and no evidence
of participation bias in any experimental decisions. Further, controlling for subjects’
expectations about the decisions of others seems to be of great importance: the ﬁt
of our models improved tremendously and impacts of gender, age and education
on investment and reward behavior were found to be sensitive when we omitted
beliefs.
The behavioral heterogeneity observed in the data was shown to be character-
ized by asymmetric responses for various sub groups of the population. In partic-
ular, low educated individuals were found to invest relatively less but reward in-
vestments relatively more than higher educated subjects. Furthermore, our results
pointed to a rather paradoxical ﬁnding occurring when comparing investment and
reward behavior across age groups– we found that the young and elderly have both
a relatively lower propensity to invest and a relatively higher propensity to reward
investmentsthanmiddle-agedindividuals. Interestingly, weshowedthattheseinef-
ﬁciencies result from subjects lowering both their propensity to invest in others and
their subjective expectations about receiving investments from others, increasing
25the odds that investments received exceed their expectations and induce a stronger
propensity to reward investments. Despite that this conjecture is supported by the
data, we do not rule out that other possible mechanism can explain our paradox.
In particular, it has been argued elsewhere (Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000) that not
living up to someone’s expectation of behavior might also play a role in determin-
ing behavior in environments involving trust. Investigation of this hypothesis in
the context of our investment game requires the elicitation of second order beliefs
which is a task requiring much higher cognitive skills from respondents, and can be
problematic when subjects have very heterogeneous backgrounds and capacities.
We leave this interesting exploration as an avenue for future research.
Another possible extension consists of decomposing investment and reward be-
havior into components of trust, reciprocity, and altruistic preferences along the
lines of Cox (2004). This would yield interesting knowledge of preferences in an
heterogeneous population and allows a more structural interpretation of behavioral
patterns.
Finally, because the incentive structure of our game resembles that of other social
dilemma games in experimental economics, some of our results may well be present
in these alternative settings. Contributions to public goods have raised considerable
interest over the last decades. How these contributions evolve in an aging world is
an important yet still unanswered question. We feel that much can be learned by
extending our experimental approach to address these issues. However, running
similar large scale experiments for social dilemma games, or any other game, may
be a source of discouragement if it is felt that research budgets could be judiciously
allocated to other projects. We feel that the insights which can be gained in other
26settings are well worth the effort, and that the appreciation of experiments within
economics as a whole can beneﬁt from such an approach. We hope to have demon-
strated that the new insights on population behavior presented in this paper make
this a line of research worthwhile pursuing in the years to come.
27A Instructions (Translation)
The ﬁrst 3 screens of the experiment are the same for both senders and responders.
Italic notes in the translation are comments by the authors.
² First screen:
This experiment is a research project of researchers from Humboldt University
Berlin and Catholic University of Brabant.16
With this experiment you can make real money in terms of CentERpoints.
You receive from the researchers additional CentERpoints (besides the usual
telephone allowance).
² Second screen:
During this experiment you will be matched with another member of the
panel. You will not know who this person is, both of you will stay anony-
mous. Both of you receive 500 CentERpoints. Then the experiments starts.
One of you has the possibility to send a share of this away. The amount of
points sent will be doubled and given to the other person. The other person
has then the opportunity to send a share of the own total amount back. The
amount which is sent back will not be doubled.
How many points you ﬁnally earn depends therefore on your decision and the
decision of the person you are matched with. You will be randomly assigned
to your role.
² Third screen:
We now give you the chance to indicate whether you want to participate. If
you decide not to participate, the experiment will end immediately. You will
receive the usual telephone reimbursement. If you continue you will receive
the 500 CentERpoints.
Do you want to continue?
° Yes
° No
16Now: Tilburg University. The Catholic University of Brabant changed its name after the experi-
ment.
28Subjects who choose to participate were then randomly assigned to their roles. Senders
and receivers had to read decision screens tailored to their roles.
Senders
² Fourth screen:
You have been matched with another member of the panel. Like you, this per-
son received 500 CentERpoints. You can send a share of your 500 CentER-
points. The panel member with whom you are matched with receives the
amount you sent multiplied by 2. Then, this person has the opportunity to
send a share of the own total amount back (without knowing who you are).
The amount which this person sends back to you will not be doubled.
How many points do you want to give?
(The sender could send one out of 11 possible amounts.)
° 0 the other person receives additionally nothing and has therefore 500 and
you remain with 500 points.
...
° 500 the other person receives additionally 1000 and has therefore 1500 in
total and you remain with 0 points.
² Fifth screen:
(was depending on the decision taken at the fourth screen, here as example “200”)
You decided to send 200 points.
The panel member you are matched with receives therefore 400 additional
CentERpoints.
He or she has therefore in total 900 CentERpoints.
You remain with 300 CentERpoints.
How many points do you think the other panel member with whom you are
matched with will send to you?
(Participants had to type in a number. In this example in the range of [0,900].)
² Sixth screen:
This experiment is done with some panel members. Half of them interact in
the same position as you. They can send a share of their 500 CentERpoints
29which is doubled and received by a person of the other position.
How many points do you think those panel members have sent?
(The sender could indicate one out of 11 possible amounts from 0 to 500).
Responders
² Fourth screen:
You have been matched with another member of the panel. Like you, this per-
son received 500 CentERpoints. This person is asked to send you a share from
their own 500 CentERpoints. You will receive the amount of those points the
other person has sent multiplied by 2.
For example, if the other person sends 100 CentERpoints, you will receive 200
CentERpoints. Together with the 500 points you begin with, you will have in
total 700 CentERpoints.
From this amount you can return a share. The amount you send will not be
doubled.
² Fifth screen:
As we do not know now how many CentERpoints the other panel member
with whom you are matched with has sent we present all possible amounts
this person could send to you. The amount you receive is written in the next
column. Please indicate in the last column what amount you would return for
each possible amount sent.
After the real decision of the other person is known the amount you indicated
for this particular decision will be realized. The amount you will return will
be deducted from your total amount.
(The responder had to indicate for each of 11 possible amounts the sender could send
what he would return. The table was designed as follows:)
If the other sends: I receive: In total with the In this case I return:
500 CentERpoints:
0 0 500




with has sent to you?
(The responder could indicate one out of 11 possible amounts from 0 to 500.)
After these screens the experiment was over. Nobody could go backwards and both
senders and responders were asked the following post–experimental questions:
² Seventh screen (Trust experience question):
The last two questions are about trust in general. This question is about your
own trust experience.
If you trust is your trust generally rewarded or exploited?
Choose the number which is closest to your answer.
always rewarded 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 always exploited.
(Participants had to type in a number between 1 and 7).
² Eight screen (WVS trust question):
Generally speaking would you say that most people can be trusted or that you
cannot be too careful in dealing with people?
1.) Most people can be trusted.
2.) You have to be very careful.








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Distribution of amounts invested
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Full strategy vector 
Belief based response 
Figure 2: Curve with squares represents the return ratio of responders using the
full strategy vector. The curve with full circles represents the return ratio computed
using subjects response only for that outcome they expected to occur during the play
of the game. NF denotes the number of subjects used to compute the return ratio for
each outcome based on the full strategy vector, NS denotes the number of subjects
used to compute the return ratio for each outcome based on their expectations.






































Figure 3: Estimated density of potential returns on investments for each amount
sent. Gaussian kernel density estimation. Rate of return computed as (rI ¡ I)/I for
each possible investment I. The rate of return is inﬁnity when the amount sent is
zero and is not plotted here.
















































Figure 4: Top panel: Relationship between investment behavior and age (dashed
line/left axis), and reward behavior and age (full line-right axis). Bottom panel:
Nonparametric relation between responder’s expected amounts invested and age
(partial linear model). Gaussian kernel used, and bandwidth chosen by cross-
validation.
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